The Effect of Liquidity on Governance

This paper studies the effect of stock liquidity on blockholders’ choice of governance mechanisms. We focus on hedge funds as they are unconstrained by legal restrictions and business ties, and thus have all governance channels at their disposal. Since the threat of governance, not just actual governance, can discipline managers, we use Section 13 filings to measure governance intent rather than only studying instances of actual governance. We find that liquidity increases the likelihood that a hedge fund acquires a block in a firm. Conditional upon acquiring a stake, liquidity reduces the likelihood that a blockholder governs through voice (intervention) – as evidenced by the greater propensity to file Schedule 13Gs (passive investment) rather than 13Ds (active investment). Liquidity is more likely to lead to a 13G filing if the manager’s wealth is sensitive to the stock price, consistent with governance through exit (trading). A 13G filing leads to positive announcement returns, especially in liquid firms. These two results suggest that liquidity does not dissuade blockholders from governing altogether, but instead encourages them to govern through exit rather than voice. We use decimalization as an exogenous shock to liquidity to identify causal effects.

Hedge Fund Activism

This paper examines the causes and consequences of hedge fund activism. Hedge funds target profitable and healthy firms, with above-average cash holdings. The target firms earn significantly higher abnormal stock returns around the initial 13D filing date than a sample of control firm. However, they do not show improvements in accounting performances in the year after the initial purchase. Instead, hedge funds extract cash from the firm through increases in the target’s debt capacity and higher dividends. Examination of proxy fights and threats accompanying the activist campaign suggests that hedge fund managers achieve their goals by posing a credible threat of engaging the target in a costly proxy solicitation contest

Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors

We examine recent confrontational shareholder activism campaigns by hedge funds and by other private investors. The three main parallels between the groups are a significantly positive market reaction for the target firm around the initial Schedule 13D filing date, a further significant increase in share price for the subsequent year, and the activist's high success rate in gaining its original objective. The two main differences are the types of companies each group targets and the activists' post-investment strategies. Hedge funds target more profitable and healthy firms than other activists. Afterwards, hedge funds reduce the target's cash holdings by increasing its leverage and dividends paid. In contrast, other activists lower the target's capital expenditures and research and development costs. In total, we conclude that the activism benefits existing shareholders of the targeted firms, but that hedge funds and other entrepreneurial activists achieve these benefits through different outlets

Can we understand modern humans without considering pathogens?

Throughout our evolutionary history, humankind has always lived in contact with large numbers of pathogens. Some cultural traits, such as sedentarization and animal domestication, have considerably increased new parasitic contacts and epidemic transitions. Here, we review the various phenotypic traits that have been proposed to be affected by the highly parasitic human environment, including fertility, birth weight, fluctuating asymmetry, body odours, food recipes, sexual behaviour, pregnancy sickness, language, religion and intellectual quotient. We also discuss how such knowledge is important to understanding several aspects of the current problems faced by humanity in our changing world and to predicting the long-term consequences of parasite eradication policies on our health and well-being. The study of the evolutionary interactions between humans and parasites is a burgeoning and most promising field, as demonstrated by the recent increasing popularity of Darwinian medicine

The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on the Target Firm's Existing Bondholders

In contrast to previous studies documenting positive abnormal returns to target shareholders, we find that hedge fund activism significantly reduces bondholders' wealth. The average excess bond return is - 3.9% around the initial 13D filing, and is an additional - 4.5% over the remaining year. Excess bond returns are related inversely to subsequent changes in cash and assets (loss of collateral effects) and directly to changes in total debt. Confrontational campaigns and the acquisition of at least one seat on the target's board elicit more negative bond returns. We also find an expropriation of wealth from the bondholder to the shareholder. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

Can Green Investments Increase Your Green? Evidence from Social Hedge Fund Activists

In our study, we examine the association between hedge fund activism and a target firm’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities and whether activists can promote socially responsible investments while upholding shareholders’ interests. Using different matched samples, we find a strong positive association between the target firm’s CSR in the year before it is targeted by activists and its probability of being targeted by a hedge fund. Classifying hedge fund activists into socially and non-socially responsible funds based on their objectives, we find that both give similar level of consideration to a firm’s CSR activities when initiating campaigns. Similar to DesJardine and Durand (DesJardine and Durand, Strategic Management Journal 41:1054–1082, 2020), we demonstrate that hedge funds have, on average, a negative impact on target firms’ CSR in the years following the initial investments. Complementary to DesJardine and Durand (DesJardine and Durand, Strategic Management Journal 41:1054–1082, 2020), we compare the two types of hedge funds and find an asymmetric effect of the hedge funds’ campaigns. Socially responsible hedge fund campaigns are associated with a large increase in their target’s CSR, whereas non-socially responsible hedge funds decrease this measure in their target. Finally, we find that target firms exhibit a long-term improvement in future stock returns and profitability. These findings provide evidence that certain types of activists, such as socially responsible funds, promote both stakeholder and shareholders’ long-term interests